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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE LEGAL GAME BEHIND FANTASY SPORTS: COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN
PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE STATISTICS

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1866, Charles A. Peverelly wrote, “The game of baseball has now
become beyond question the leading feature of the outdoor sports of the United
States…It is a game which is peculiarly suited to the American temperament
and disposition…in short, the pastime suits the people, and the people suit the
pastime.” 1
Attracting nearly seventy-five million fans in attendance alone in 2005,
Peverelly’s observation remains as true today as it did in 1866. 2 With baseball
being labeled “America’s national pastime” and “as American as apple pie,” it
is far from surprising to see a dramatic increase in online games, such as
fantasy baseball, considering the American public’s fascination with the sport.
Accordingly, Major League Baseball (“MLB”) has increasingly sought to
capitalize on the fans’ fascination with the game and channel it into a source of
revenue. From game day internet broadcasts to online baseball arcades, the
modern day baseball fan can experience the thrill of baseball in ways the fans
of the Stan Musial, Babe Ruth or Bob Gibson eras could never imagine. T his
interactive and modern day experience, however, has not come without its
headaches.
Nearly four million Americans currently play the cyber version of baseball,
and an estimated twelve million more fans play other online fantasy sports
games. 3 Originating from a grassroots hobby nearly a quarter century ago,
fantasy baseballers now spend an average of $175 million annually which
makes fantasy baseball a highly-competitive, $1 billion industry. 4 Fantasy
baseball literally allows fans to become general managers of their own virtual
1. Baseball Almanac, Home Page, available at http://www.baseball-almanac.com/ (last
visited Jan. 20, 2007).
2. Baseball Almanac, National League Attendance in 2005, available at
http://www.baseball-almanac.com/charts/attendance-nl/attendance-nl2005.shtml (last visited Jan.
20, 2007).
3. Greg Auman, Baseball Looking to Recapture Imaginations, ST . PETERSBURG T IM ES,
Feb. 17, 2005, at C2.
4. Greg Johnson, Suing Over Statistics, LOS ANGELES T IM ES, Jan. 2, 2006, at D1; Tresa
Baldas, Taking Statistics: Does Major League Baseball Own Player Statistics? Some Say It’s a
Fantasy, IP. L. & Bus., Apr. 2005, at 10.
129
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baseball teams. Fans can draft existing Major League Baseball players onto
their virtual teams, and then conduct trades, pick up free agent players from the
free agent pool and even decide who to play. This entire fantasy world is
centered on the ballplayers’ real life performance statistics which fantasy
providers gather and input into online databases. It is ownership of these
statistics that has lead one online fantasy sports provider to challenge whether
anyone can own professional performance statistics.
Part II of this article explores the history behind copyright protection for
historical facts and factual compilations. Part III of this article will discuss the
historical origins for the right of publicity and focus on two main elements of
the right of publicity: identity and exploiting that identity through a
commercial use. Part III also focuses on the public interest exception to using
one’s identity for a commercial use. Part IV of this article concludes that
baseball statistics, as used in the fantasy sports world, are not copyrightable as
factual compilations because the originality in selection and arrangement in
fantasy sports databases does not satisfy the minimum level of creativity to
afford copyright protection. Part IV also concludes a professional performance
statistic is not a part of one’s identity because the nature of the baseball
statistic is raw, statistical data within the public domain constituting mere bits
of baseball history. Even further, Part IV concludes that a third party can
commercially exploit baseball statistics because the history of baseball
demands a substantial public interest.
A. MLB/MLBPA Licensing Agreement
On January 19, 2005, the Major League Baseball Players Association
(“MLBPA”) and Major League Baseball Advanced Media (“MLBAM”)
entered into a five year, $50 million exclusive agreement that allows MLB to
exploit and market the personal attributes of the players’ through interactive
media. 5 This agreement also provides the MLBAM with the exclusive rights
to use and to sublicense to others the rights of MLB players for the
development and creation of online games, as well as all wireless applications
including cell-phone enabled games. 6
By entering into this agreement, MLB is seeking to begin a dramatic
reworking of its own online fantasy games to narrow the gap between the
steadily increasing fantasy baseball market and the surging interest in fantasy
football. 7 This renovation includes adding video highlights, wireless

5. Auman, supra note 3; see also Complaint at 4, C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major
League Baseball Advanced Media, 443 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D. Mo. 2005).
6. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 4.
7. See Auman, supra note 3. It should be noted that fantasy baseball is far from struggling.
As mentioned earlier, it is estimated that between two and four million Americans alone play
fantasy baseball compared to an estimated twelve million fantasy footballers. Id.
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applications and modified gaming to attract more casual fantasy fans. 8
However, if this agreement is upheld, it is speculated that MLB will
concentrate the fantasy baseball market from about thirteen officially licensed
MLB websites to four or five major websites offering official MLB fantasy
gaming. 9 Bob Bowman, who oversees MLB Advanced Media, suggests that a
reduction is likely stating, “[i]t appears that licensors think they can create a
bigger business by concentrating licensees.” 10 But not all fantasy faithfuls
believe Major League Baseball’s reduction in consumer choices will stimulate
baseball’s fantasy gaming. Gary Ambrosius, president of the Fantasy Sports
Trade Commission, advocates the opposite approach stating, “[i]t would be
tough to take all the fantasy choices now available and put them under just a
few umbrellas.” 11
B. C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Incorporated v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media
Not all major fantasy sports providers have complied with MLB’s attempt
to control the fantasy baseball market. In February of 2005, one fantasy
provider, C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, (operating under the surname
C.D.M. Fantasy Sports) challenged the MLB licensing deal by filing suit in the
United States District Court of Eastern Missouri. 12 While many of the MLB’s
previous licensees have complied with the agreement, C.D.M., who provides
fantasy gaming services for USA Today, Sports Weekly, The Hockey News,
The Golf Channel, The Sporting News, MSNBC and Snap, is the only previous
official MLB licensee that has refused to comply with MLB’s request. 13 By
filing suit, C.D.M. sought for the court to declare that C.D.M.’s fantasy gaming
operation has not violated any intellectual property, copyright or publicity
rights allegedly owned or controlled by MLB. 14 Although C.D.M. had
formerly entered into a licensing agreement with the MLBPA covering the
rights to names, nicknames, numbers, likenesses, signatures, pictures, playing
records and biographical data, the agreement expired on December 31, 2004. 15

8. Michael Hiestand, Fantasy Choices May Narrow, USA T ODAY, Feb. 9, 2005, at 12C.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
13. See Auman, supra note 3; see also Complaint, supra note 5, at 1.
14. See Complaint, supra note 5, at 1. In addition to the claims mentioned above, C.D.M.
also claims that their actions have not constituted trademark, false or deceptive advertising, or
trade practices under state and federal law. Id. However, those issues are not relevant to the
discussion at hand.
15. Id. at 4.
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The issue seems simple. Who owns professional performance statistics?
But, this simple question is an issue of first impression for the courts. 16
C.D.M. attorney Rudy Telscher concedes that trademarked material, such as
logos, need a MLB license, but claims that essentially no one owns
performance statistics because they are in the public domain, much like
telephone books. 17 Telscher and other supporters for an open fantasy market
also claim that performance statistics are not copyrightable because statistics
involve mere raw data where creativity is not involved. 18
Jim Gallagher, a spokesperson for, MLBAM argues that C.D.M. and other
fantasy sports providers should be paying for the right to use such statistics in a
game for profit and that ownership of baseball statistics lies with MLB when
used for commercial gain. 19 More specifically, MLB and the MLBAM
contend that the methods for compiling, organizing and keeping player
statistics are copyrightable.
However, much of the recent litigation
surrounding performance statistics boils down to a fairly young and
developing doctrine called the right of publicity. 20
Professor McCarthy claims that the right of publicity can be stated with
clarity; it is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial
use of his or her identity. 21 Even though stating this right may be simple,
determining what constitutes a commercial use of one’s identity has become
increasingly difficult to determine due to the uncertainty and variation among
scholars and courts.
II. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION – ORIGINALITY IN THE SELECTION AND
ARRANGEMENT OF FACTUAL COMPILATIONS
Fantasy sports providers, like C.D.M., conduct their online gaming by
gathering raw statistical information and inputting these statistics into an
online database which can then be accessed by online fantasy subscribers. 22
Essentially, the existence of fantasy sports relies on the ability of the user to
access the database(s) which harness the ballplayers’ statistics. 23 Whether
copyright protection extends to baseball statistics contained in a fantasy
baseball factual compilation is a central question in the current lawsuit.
16. See Hiestand, supra note 8.
17. See Baldas, supra note 4.
18. See Hiestand, supra note 8.
19. See Baldas, supra note 4.
20. Alan Schartz, Claiming It Owns the Rights to Players’ Names, Baseball Tells Fantasy
Leagues to Pay up. The Leagues Tell Baseball to Dream on, LEGAL AFF., Nov./Dec. 2005, at
22.
21. J. T HOM AS MCCARTHY ET AL., MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTELLECT UA L
PROPERTY 528 (3d ed. 2004).
22. See Baldas, supra note 4.
23. Id.
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“A compilation is a work formed by the collection and assembling of
preexisting materials or of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in
such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes as an original work of
authorship.” 24 However, under U.S. Federal copyright law, the protection for a
database as a factual compilation is limited. 25 A copyright for a factual
compilation does not extend to preexisting works, such as the individual pieces
of information stored in the database. 26 The only information that is protected
is the material that is contributed by the author, not any preexisting material. 27
Compilations that are purely factual and involve no creativity in selection,
arrangement or organization are not entitled to copyright protection since there
is a presumption at law that raw facts can be copied at will. 28 For example, in
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 29 the plaintiff spent millions of dollars in
developing a nationwide business and home phone directory entitled ProCD. 30
The directory, which consisted of over ninety-five million names, nine digit zip
codes and census industrial codes, was packaged and sold at several retail
outlets. 31 Zeidenburg purchased ProCD’s directory program at a retailer and
merged it with other business and home phone directories. 32 Zeidenburg then
made his hybrid database available on the internet. 33 The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit held that an online database which has been made from the
white pages in a phone book was not entitled to copyright protection because
the compilation lacked originality in the selection and arrangement of the
names and zipcodes. 34
In National Basketball Association v. Motorola, Inc., 35 the NBA brought
action against Motorola, a manufacturer and marketer of the SportsTrax paging
device, for supplying player and team statistics and game information to
Motorola subscribers with such pagers. 36 The operation of the SportsTrax
pager relied on data supplied by reporters who watched the games on

24. 17. U.S.C. § 101 (2004) (defining “compilation”).
25. Ian C. Ballon, Copyright Protection for Databases, in 1 E-COM M ERCE & INTERNET
LAW ¶ 9.02[1] (2006).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. 908 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. Wis. 1996).
30. Id. at 644.
31. Id. at 644-45.
32. Id. at 645.
33. Id.
34. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenburg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996).
35. 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 843-44. The type of information conveyed to Motorola’s subscribers included: the
teams playing; score changes, the team in possession of the ball, whether the team is in the freethrow bonus, the quarter of the game, time remaining in the quarter, field goal shooting
percentages by player and team and top scorers. Id.
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television or listened to the games on the radio. 37 The information was then
transmitted to Motorola by phone, and then transmitted to the SportsTrax
pagers. 38 The plaintiff’s complaint alleged federal copyright protection in the
statistical information that Motorola conveyed to its customers. 39 The Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that no copyright infringement existed
because Motorola only reproduced factual information from the broadcasts and
underlying basketball games, and this did not infringe on the actual copyright
of the broadcasts. 40
When analyzing the copyright protection for the underlying basketball
game, the court concluded that the actual basketball game did not fall within
the subject matter of federal copyright protection because the games did not
constitute original works of authorship. 41 The court reasoned that sports
events are not authored in any common sense of the word and what
“authorship” there is in a sports event must be open to copying by competitors
if fans are to be attracted to the sport. 42 However, the court noted that
“recorded broadcasts of NBA games – as opposed to the games
themselves…are…entitled to copyright protection.” 43 Despite the fact that
broadcasts are protected under copyright law, the court further held that
Motorola did not infringe on the NBA’s copyright because they did not
reproduce the expression of the game broadcasts, but only facts from the
broadcast, which “any patron of an NBA game could acquire from the arena
without any involvement from the director, cameramen, or others who
contribute to the originality of a broadcast.” 44 Thus, factual information
37. Id. at 844.
38. Id. Note that the actual electronic process of communicating the statistics to the pager is
unimportant. For those interested, Judges Altimari and Winters in the Motorola case do a nice
job of breaking down the actual process used to transmit the statistics. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 847.
41. Motorola, 105 F.3d at 846-47. Although many supporters of the MLB’s copyright
protection in players’ performances will rely on Baltimore Orioles Inc. v. Major League Baseball,
one should take note that the Court in Motorola¸ expressly negates the NBA’s reliance on this
case. The Court in Motorola states:
In claiming a copyright in the underlying games, the NBA relied in part on a footnote in
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v Major League Baseball Players Assn. which states that the
‘players performances’ contain the ‘modest creativity’ required for copyright ability.’
However the court went on to state, ‘Moreover, even if the [p]layers’ performances were
not sufficiently creative, the [p]layers agree that the cameramen and director contribute
labor to the telecasts.’ This last sentence indicates that the court was considering the
copyright ability of telecasts – not underlying games, which obviously can be played
without cameras.
Id. (citations omitted).
42. Id. at 846.
43. Id. at 847.
44. Id.
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pertaining to the underlying sports event is not copyrightable even though the
broadcast of the game retains copyright protection.
On the other hand, raw facts or data may be subject to protection where the
selection, arrangement or organization of the data reflect some minimal level
of creativity. 45 Thus, the Federal Copyright Act extends copyright protection
to compilations that are “selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting whole constitutes an original work of authorship.” 46 In Feist
Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co.,47 the United States Supreme
Court held that originality is essential for a work to be protected under
copyright law. 48 The defendant, Rural, a public utility company, provided
telephone services and published white pages with an alphabetical listing of
subscribers’ names, towns and telephone numbers. 49 Feist, a publishing
company that also distributed phone books, incorporated Rural’s white pages
into its own phone book after Rural refused to issue a license to Feist. 50 Rural
then sued for copyright infringement claiming that Feist, in compiling its own
directory, could not use the directory compiled by Rural in its white pages. 51
In reaching its holding, the Supreme Court reaffirmed several important
principles of copyright law, as well as, establishing new ground rules for future
infringements. First, the Court forcefully reminded the legal world of a
“fundamental axiom of copyright law” that there is no valid copyright in
facts. 52 Second, the Court expanded on this “fundamental axiom” by stating
that facts must be original to the author to qualify for copyright protection. 53
Original, as used in copyright, means “that the work was independently created
by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.” 54 In addition to articulating a new
standard for factual compilations, the Court observed that originality is a
constitutionally mandated prerequisite for copyright protection. 55
The Supreme Court went on to note that protection for factual compilations
is thin. 56 A subsequent compiler is free to use facts contained in a copyrighted
compilation to aid in preparing a competing work, as long as the competing
45. See Ballon, supra note 25.
46. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 101.
47. 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
48. Id. at 351.
49. Id. at 342.
50. Id. at 342-43.
51. Id. at 344.
52. Id. at 344-45.
53. Feist, 499 U.S. at 344-45.
54. Id. at 345.
55. Id. at 351. This principle was recognized by several commentators and courts before
Feist, but this marked the first time that the Supreme Court held originality was constitutionally
mandated for copyright protection.
56. Id. at 349.
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work uses a slightly different arrangement and selection process. 57 The
Supreme Court ultimately concluded that Rural’s compilation did not satisfy
the originality requirement because the selection and arrangement of the names
and numbers were “garden-variety” and entirely typical of a phonebook (i.e.
alphabetical order) and, thus did not represent the minimum level of creativity
to afford copyright protection. 58
Many supporters of MLB’s position in the current lawsuit heavily rely on
Kregos v. Associated Press, 59 where the Court held that certain baseball
performance charts were entitled to copyright protection. 60 However, reliance
on this case in the present lawsuit will not carry MLB far. In Kregos, the
plaintiff compiled pitching charts for opposing pitchers to start each day’s
baseball games comprising of nine very specific pitching categories, such as
earned run average, win/loss record and innings pitched for home and away
games against specific teams, men on base average and innings pitched for the
past three starts. 61 The Court stated that “the decision to express a pitcher’s
performance in terms of nine statistics from at least scores of available
statistics about pitching performance available to be calculated from the
underlying data and therefore thousands of combinations of data that a selector
can choose to include in a pitching form” was not necessarily obvious or selfevident. 62 Additionally, the Court took note that prior publication of some of
the statistics which Kregos used on his forms might indicate that his selection
was not sufficiently different from those grouped in earlier publications to
satisfy minimal creativity. 63
57. Id. In expanding on this concept the court notes that one commentator explains it as:
“[N]o matter how much original authorship the work displays, the facts and ideas it exposes are
free for the taking…. [T]he very same facts and ideas may be divorced from the context imposed
by the author, and restated or reshuffled by second comers, even if the author was the first to
discover the facts or to propose the ideas.” Id. (quoting Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and
Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works of Information, 90 COLUM . L. REV. 1865,
1868, n.12 (1990)).
58. Id. at 362.
59. 937 F.2d 700 (2d Cir. 1993).
60. Id. at 702.
61. Id. In more detail, the Court characterized the statistics like so:
The first category in Kregos 1983 form, performance during the entire season, comprises
two items—won/lost record (1) and earned run average (2). The second category,
performance during the entire season against the opposing team at the site of the game,
comprises three items—won/lost record (3), innings pitched (4), and earned run average
(5). The third category, performance in the last three starts, comprises four items—
won/lost record (6), innings pitched (7), earned run average (8), and men on base average
(9). Id.
This last item is the average total of hits and walks given up by a pitcher per nine innings of
pitching. Id.
62. Id. at 704-705.
63. Id. at 705.
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Fantasy baseball does not operate on complicated statistics such as wins
against a particular team either on the road or at home. The fantasy baseball
market thrives on general statistics, such as home runs, runs batted in, steals
and wins by pitchers. Therefore, there are not “scores” of available statistics to
play fantasy baseball. Fantasy baseball takes the general, “garden-variety”
baseball statistics and uses them in their raw form without breaking down such
numbers into road wins against a particular team or earned run average at
home against a particular team in the past three starts. The numbers utilized by
the fantasy baseball market are no more complicated or expected than box
scores published in the newspaper. The logic expressed in Kregos simply
doesn’t apply to the case at hand.
Further, as Ian Ballon notes, “for online databases, creativity in the
selection of incorporated facts is substantially more important than their
arrangement,” because online users have the ability to search and sort the data
using multiple means. 64 Thus, the contention that online databases may
require greater creativity in selection to offset the lack of arrangement has
substantial bite, especially concerning the online fantasy sports market. The
originality in the arrangement of facts is essentially a non-factor for online
fantasy sports providers because fantasy sports databases allow their customers
to search every statistic contained in the database in any order and fashion as
that user pleases.
In summary, factual information from sports events are not subject to
copyright protection because sports events are not authored in any sense of the
word. However, factual compilations can obtain copyright protection if the
compilation is an original work of authorship. Originality in the sense of
factual compilations consists of selectivity or arrangement in the factual data.
The selectivity or arrangement must possess a minimum level of creativity
which must be more than what is entirely typical or expected of such a
compilation. But, as the United States Supreme Court has noted, protection for
such factual compilations is thin.
III. T HE RIGHT OF P UBLICITY – HISTORY AND ORIGIN
Many scholars have characterized the right of publicity as a descendant of
the right of privacy. 65 Privacy, as a legal right, dates to Samuel Warren and
Louis Brandeis and their 1890 article, The Right of Privacy, which focused on
the harm posed by publishing a citizen’s private facts and photographs. 66 T his

64. See Ballon, supra note 25. For an overview of copyright law in the European Union, this
chapter lays out this topic nicely. Id.
65. J. T HOM AS MCCARTHY, T HE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (West 2d. ed.
2004).
66. Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition 67 U. PITT .
L. REV. 225, 227 (2005).
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notion of privacy enumerated by Warren and Brandeis explicitly recognized an
individual’s “right to be let alone” which courts have interpreted to encompass
the notion of “hurt feelings.” 67 However, the right of privacy was a poor
remedy for celebrities and athletes in protecting their image and likeness from
the uncompensated efforts of exploiters because celebrities profit from
publicity and being in the public spotlight. 68 Thus, courts took notice of the
right of privacy’s inefficiency to protect celebrities and in Haelan
Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 69 the court recognized a
similar common law and statutory right of privacy existed for celebrities. 70
In Haelan Laboratories, the plaintiff, a manufacturer and seller of chewing
gum, contracted with several baseball players to provide the plaintiff with the
exclusive right to use the players’ photographs in connection with the gum
sales. 71 Although the ballplayers were not to grant any other gum
manufacturer a similar right during the contract, the defendant, also a
manufacturer and seller of chewing gum, induced the players to enter into
contracts that authorized the defendant to use the players’ photographs in
connection with gum sales. 72 In characterizing the new right of privacy, the
Court stated:
In addition to and independent of that right of privacy, a man has a right in the
publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege
of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made ‘in gross,’
i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else.
Whether it be labeled a ‘property’ right is immaterial; for here, as often
elsewhere, the tag ‘property’ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a
claim which has pecuniary worth...This right might be called a ‘right of
publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons
(especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised
through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they
no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their
countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, buses, trains and
subways. 73

Although courts were reluctant to build upon this newly developed right,
Professor Melville Nimmer’s groundbreaking article entitled, The Right of
67. Id. at 227-228.
68. Id.; see also Jack F. Williams, Who Owns the Back of a Baseball Card?: A Baseball
Player’s Right In His Performance Statistics, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1705, 1714 (2002).
69. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953).
70. See Williams, supra note 68, at 1714. Note that Professor McKenna correctly points out
that Haelen Laboratories was not the first case to recognize the right of publicity but, rather, the
first case to recognize the right of publicity for celebrities. See McKenna, supra note 66, at 1617.
71. Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d at 867.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 868.
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Publicity, helped provide a framework for establishing a violation of the right
of publicity. 74 Professor Nimmer argued that traditional privacy law was
inadequate to protect an unauthorized commercial use of a person’s identity
because the right of privacy hinged on the concept of hurt feelings. 75
Nimmer’s argument relied upon a 1941 case in which a celebrity sued under
the New York privacy statute because the celebrity’s name was used without
his consent on an official program to a bicycle race. 76 In that case, the plaintiff
admitted that he did not suffer humiliation from the unauthorized use of his
persona and the court, finding only a technical violation of the privacy statute,
awarded six cents to plaintiff as damages. 77 Nimmer argued that the true
commercial value of the plaintiff’s identity was worth more that six cents, and
that the law of privacy simply was inadequate to deal with such claims. 78
Until the 1970’s, the right of publicity was met with reluctance and
concern by many judges and practitioners. 79 However, most courts began to
recognize a commercial property interest in human identity as being quite
different from the traditional notions of privacy interests. 80 In 1977, the
Supreme Court, in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 81
recognized that a commercial right in one’s identity existed and observed the
right of publicity’s distinctness from privacy law. 82 In Zacchini, the plaintiff’s
fifteen second “human cannonball” act was, without his consent, videotaped in
its entirety at a county fair by a reporter for the defendant broadcasting
company and shown on a television news program later that day. 83 Plaintiff
then brought an action for damages in state court against the broadcasting
company alleging an “unlawful appropriation” of his “professional property.”84
In addition to recognizing the right of publicity as a cause of action distinct
from privacy law, the Court recognized that the broadcast of the plaintiff’s
entire act posed a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance
because: (1) if the public can see the act free on television, it would be less
willing to pay to see it at the fair and (2) the broadcast goes to the heart of
petitioner’s ability to earn a living. 85 In the Court’s discussion of the right of
publicity, it stated that:

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, at § 1:27.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, at § 1:27
Id. at § 1:31.
433 U.S. 562 (1977).
See Williams, supra note 68, at 1712.
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563-564.
Id. at 564.
Id. at 575-576.
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the rationale for protecting the right of publicity is the straight forward one of
preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of good will. No social purpose is
served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would
have market value and for which he would normally pay. 86

A. Justifications for the Right of Publicity
Supporters of the right of publicity have offered several rationales for
upholding the right to prevent the uncompensated use of one’s identity. For
example, the natural rights of property theorists suggest that every human
being should be given control over the commercial use of his or her identity
and should be able to control such use of his or her identity as the holder sees
fit. 87
Another theory, more frequently relied upon, is a Lockean property based
justification. Lockean theorists rely on Locke’s explanation of private property
which states:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every
Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but
himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say are
properly his. 88

The Lockean justification suggests that the right of publicity should be
protected like a property right, and that a person’s identity should legally be
recognized as a person’s property which can then be protected against
commercial exploitation. 89 Where the right of privacy recognizes a legal
injury due to unpermitted uses that cause “hurt feelings,” the right of publicity
recognizes a legal injury when the unpermitted use of one’s identity causes
financial damage flowing from the economic value of one’s identity. 90
86. Id. at 576. For an attack on the unjust enrichment justification for the right of publicity,
see The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self Definition by Mark P. McKenna arguing that:
a defendant is only ‘free riding’ if one assumes that the value of identity belongs to the
plaintiff in the first instance. The assumption of initial ownership must itself be supported
by some theory...Whether some object will have market value for which someone else
would normally pay depends entirely on whether the law protects the object. Absent legal
protection for identity, an advertiser normally would not pay to use it. Thus, we cannot
conclude that there is no social purpose in allowing a defendant to make use of an identity
freely without determining why we should allocate all of the value of that identity to the
individual. If no compelling theory calls for such an initial allocation, then protecting
identity would only allow celebrities to earn an undeserved profit by charging others to
use their identity.
McKenna, supra note 66, at 248.
87. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, at § 2:1.
88. J OHN LOCKE, T WO T REATISES OF GOVERNM ENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1960).
89. See MCCARTHY, supra note 65, at § 2:2.
90. Id.
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The incentive rationale supports the theory that the right of publicity gives
economic incentives for persons that enter the public eye to undertake socially
useful or enriching activities. 91 Supporters of this justification argue that by
granting such people an economic right in their identity, it encourages people
to channel uses of their identity into socially beneficial activities. 92
A final justification, which has its roots in unjust enrichment theory, is the
economic theory. This theory recognizes that granting property rights in the
commercial use of one’s identity is an efficient way to allocate resources
because the advertiser to whom that identity is most valuable will pay to use
the identity. 93 It is the debate on the applicability of these theories that has
lead to much of the right of publicity’s current state of confusion.
B. Elements of a Right of Publicity Claim
The right of publicity is recognized under the common law of eighteen
states, and of those eighteen, eight states have statutory counter-parts that are
broad enough to encompass the common law right of publicity. 94 For
example, California’s common law right of publicity consists of four elements:
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of the
91. Id. at § 2:6.
92. Id.
93. Id. at § 2.7; see also WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, T HE ECONOM IC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 223 (Harvard Univ. Press 2003). Landes and
Posner take a tragedy of the commons approach arguing:
The motive [to provide stronger publicity rights] is not to encourage greater investment in
becoming a celebrity (the incremental encouragement would doubtless be minimal), but to
prevent the premature exhaustion of the commercial value of the celebrity’s name or
likeness...Overgrazing causes crowding in the short run, with a resulting reduction in
weight gain [by the animals’ grazing], and depletion of the pasture in the long run with
similar, though possibly more drastic results. Similarly, overexposure of a celebrity may
turn people off in the short run and truncate the period in which his name or likeness
retains commercial value.
Id.
In contrast, Professor McKenna offers several attacks on the economic justification of the right of
publicity. Professor McKenna argues that there many dissimilarities between identities and
physical commodities like pastures. McKenna, supra note 65, at 249. Professor McKenna
proposes that pastures are rivalrous and exhaustible where identities are neither because:
whereas each pasture physically removes something and threatens to reduce the pastures
utility in the long run, additional uses of identity neither prevent anyone else’s use of that
identity nor use up any of the resource in a physical sense.
Id.
Further, Professor McKenna argues that celebrities’ identities, unlike pastures, are not scarce
resources which create a net social loss when the identities are dissipated. Id.
94. See MCCARTHY, supra note 66, at § 6:3. Those states that have recognized the right of
publicity under the common law are: Arizona, Alabama, California, Connecticut, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

142

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:129

plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or
otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury. 95 In contrast, to
establish California’s broader statutory right of publicity claim, a plaintiff must
show that a person knowingly used another’s “name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner on or in products, merchandise, or
goods, or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of
products, merchandise, goods or services, without such person’s prior
consent . . . .” 96
An additional ten states have recognized the right of publicity as being
intertwined in already existing state privacy statutes. 97 For example, New
York’s version of the right of publicity states:
[a] person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes, or for the
purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having first obtained the written consent of such person, or if a minor of his or
her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misdemeanor. 98

Other states, such as Missouri, adopt the RESTATEMENT (T HIRD) OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION test which states that: “(1) the defendant used plaintiff’s
name as a symbol of his identity; (2) without consent; (3) and with the intent to
obtain a commercial advantage.” 99
Although some scholars have lobbied for a federal enactment to help unify
the law among the states, no such federal statute exits. 100 However, the right
of publicity when boiled down to its component parts generally contains three
central elements: plaintiff’s identity, commercial exploitation and consent. 101
C. Identifying One’s Identity
The right of publicity as construed by many state statutes and common law
rights specifically created economic protection for uncompensated uses of
one’s “persona.” In every state, these terms have been interpreted to include
one’s name and likeness. 102 The most common example of a violation of the
right of publicity comes in the form of using one’s name or photo in an
95. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 310 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
96. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997).
97. See MCCARTHY, supra note 66, at § 6:3. Twenty-eight states recognize either a
common law or statutory right of publicity. Id.
98. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (McKinney 1992). New York refers to the right of
publicity as a right of privacy even though the same protections are afforded. Id.
99. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 369 (Mo. 2003); RESTATEM ENT (T HIRD) OF
UNFAIR COM PETITION § 46 (1995).
100. RESTATEM ENT (T HIRD) OF UNFAIR COM PETITION § 46 (discussing the differences in
laws between the states).
101. Consent is not at issue in the present case and, therefore, will not be discussed in this
paper.
102. See McCarthy, supra note 66, at § 4:45.
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advertisement or on a product to gain a commercial advantage. 103 However,
saying that the right of publicity only protects one’s persona, which was
defined by Judge Sofaer as “the public image that makes people want to
identify with the object person, and thereby imbues his name or likeness with
commercial value marketable to those that seek such identification,” does not
encompass the broad parameters the right of publicity has come to protect. 104
Aside from the protections of one’s name and likeness mentioned above, some
states have extended protection to characteristic phrases and even one’s
voice. 105
It is important to note that the parameters of protection are highly
jurisdictional. Only certain states such as California, Florida, Nevada,
Oklahoma, Tennessee and Texas statutorily protect photographs, and only
certain states such as California, Nevada, Oklahoma and Texas statutorily
extend the right of publicity to protect a person’s voice. 106 But the question
still remains whether the raw statistic is considered a part of one’s identity.
The case law on this issue is limited, but provides important repercussions for
the answer to this question.
In Palmer v. Schonhorn Enterprises Inc., 107 the defendants created and
sold a game called “Pro-Am Golf Game” in which short biographies and
profiles of twenty-three golfers were included on sheets of paper as part of the
contents to the game. 108 Each of the profiles contained accurate facts
concerning the golfers’ professional careers. 109 After the defendant refused to
remove the names and profiles from the game, the plaintiff sued claiming that
the use of the golfers’ names reduced their ability to obtain satisfactory
commercial affiliation through licensing agreements, and that such use was an
unfair exploitation and commercialization of their names and reputations. 110
The defendant claimed that the information contained in the profiles was
readily obtainable public data and available to all, and thus should not be
103. See, e.g., Hogan v. A. S. Barnes & Co., Inc., 114 U.S.P.Q. 314, 315, 320 (Pa.Com. Pl.
1957) (name and photo of golfer Ben Hogan); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc.
v. American Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 698 (Ga. 1982) (name and bust of the late
Martin Luther King, Jr.); Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., 75 F.3d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir.
1996) (name used in advertisement for Ford Trucks).
104. See McCarthy, supra note 66, at § 4:45.
105. PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, Rights of Publicity and Entertainment Licensing 845
PLI/Pat 283, 296 (October-December 2005) (lecture by Edward H. Rosenthal, Frankfurt Kurnit
Klein & Selz, P.C.); see also CARSON V. HERE’S J OHNNY PORTABLE T OILETS, INC., 810 F.2d
104, 105-106 (6th Cir. 1987) and MIDLER V. FORD MOTOR CO., 849 F.2d 460, 461, 463 (9th Cir.
1988).
106. RESTATEM ENT (T HIRD) OF UNFAIR COM PETITION § 46.
107. 232 A.2d 458 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967).
108. Palmer, 232 A.2d at 459.
109. Id.
110. Id..
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denied the privilege of what is set forth in newspapers, magazine articles and
other periodicals. 111
The court, without discussing a case that supports the conclusion that a
statistic qualifies as being apart of one’s likeness or identity, erroneously
concluded that use of the data by the defendant’s “for the purpose of
capitalizing upon the name by using it in connection with a commercial project
other than the dissemination of news or articles or biographies” constituted a
violation of the celebrity’s right of privacy. 112 The court stated that “the names
of the plaintiff have become internationally famous, undoubtedly by reason of
talent as well as hard work in perfecting it.” 113 Further the court stated that:
[t]hey (plaintiffs’) may not all desire to capitalize upon their names in the
commercial field beyond or apart from that in which they have reached their
known excellence...It is unfair that one should be permitted to commercialize
or exploit or capitalize upon another’s reputation or accomplishment merely
because the owner’s accomplishments have been highly publicized. 114

Unfortunately, the court in Palmer did not make an independent analysis of
identity to determine whether the exact nature of the information being used
constituted part of the golfers’ identity. Instead the court only focused on the
fact that the defendants were commercially exploiting the statistical
information and names of the golfers. The court should have first made a
determination on whether the statistical and biographical information obtained
in the profiles amounted to the likeness or persona of the golfers and if so, then
made a determination on whether that information was being commercially
exploited. However, the court glossed over the question of whether statistical
information can be characterized as one’s identity, and therefore, came to the
wrong conclusion.
The Court in Uhlaender v. Henricksen 115 followed the faulty analysis as
set forth in Palmer. In Uhlaender, the defendants manufactured and sold
games called “Negamco’s Major League Baseball” and “Big League Manager
Baseball” which employed the names and professional statistical information
such as batting, fielding, earned run and other averages of 500 to 700 major
league baseball players, identified by team, uniform number and the player’s
position. 116 The MLBPA, on behalf of the plaintiff, wrote a letter to the
defendant stating that defendant was exploiting a claimed property right and
offered to enter into a restrictive licensing agreement with the defendants. 117
111. Id. at 460.
112. Id at 462. Note that New Jersey recognizes the right of publicity through the common
law right of privacy. See id. at 459-461.
113. Id. at 462.
114. Palmer, 232 A.2d at 462.
115. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
116. Uhlaender, 316 F. Supp. at 1278.
117. Id. at 1278-1279.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

THE LEGAL GAME BEHIN D FAN TASY SPORTS

145

The defendant claimed that the names and statistics concerning sports
achievements used in the game were readily available to anyone at Major
League Offices on inquiry and were published with some regularity in the
newspapers and news media and were, thus, in the public domain. 118 The
court, relying heavily on the Palmer decision, reasoned that:
...a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality. A
celebrity must be considered to have invested his years of practice and
competition in a public personality which eventually may reach marketable
status. That identity, embodied in his name, likeness, statistics and other
personal characteristics, is the fruit of his labors and is a type of property.
Defendant’s contention has no merit that by the publication in the news media
and because of the ready availability to anyone of the names and statistical
information concerning the players, such information is in the public domain
and the players thus have waived their rights to relief in this case. Such
argument may or may not have some weight against a right of privacy claim,
but in an appropriation action such as in the case at bar the names and statistics
are valuable only because of their past public disclosure, publicity and
circulation. 119

The court’s holding and reasoning is wrong for the same reasons the
court’s analysis in Palmer is wrong. The court in Uhlaender did not focus on
the underlying nature of the information being conveyed. Instead, it focused
on how the information was being used which inevitably lead the court to skip
the independent analysis of whether a statistic constitutes a part of one’s
identity. Additionally, the court expanded the right of publicity even further
than in Palmer by stating that personal characteristics are protected because
they are fruits of the celebrity’s labor. 120 The court’s analysis is mind
boggling. Under the new test, if a third party even so much as uses the birth
date of the celebrity, it would constitute a violation of the right of publicity
under the rationale that the birth date is the fruit of the celebrity’s labors.
D. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball – The Nature of the Information
Fortunately, the court in Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball 121 departed
from the Palmer and Uhlaender courts’ faulty conclusions and properly dealt
with the issues of identity and commercialization separately, and the result was
dramatically different. In Gionfriddo, the California Court of Appeals for the
First District was presented with the issue of whether MLB violated former
ballplayers’ right of publicity when the MLB used factual data concerning the
players, their performance statistics, photographs, verbal descriptions and

118.
119.
120.
121.

Id. at 1279.
Id. at 1282-1283.
Id.
114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

146

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:129

video depictions without the players’ permission or compensation. 122 The
plaintiffs were four professional baseball players who played in the major
leagues for different periods between 1932 and 1948 and alleged that MLB
appropriated their names and likenesses. 123 Throughout the players’ careers,
numerous statistics and achievements were compiled, such as three players
being honored with All-Star recognition and all four players appearing in a
World Series. 124 Due to these accomplishments, MLB included the
ballplayers’ names and statistics, along with other former players, in assorted
All-Star game programs, World Series programs and on its official websites. 125
The players’ names also appeared in written accounts, video depictions and
within lists of team members or award winners, such as the recipient of the
“Most Valuable Player” award. 126 Some of the ballplayers had still
photographs from their playing days and footage of their performances
included within video histories distributed or produced by MLB or MLB
affiliates. 127
Before analyzing the issue of commercial use, the court in Gionfriddo
stated, “We believe the balancing process begins by identifying and weighing
the factors properly taken into account. At a minimum, a court must first
consider the nature of the precise information conveyed and the context of the
communication to determine the public interest in the expression.” 128 In
looking at the nature of the precise information being used the court concluded
that the information conveyed by MLB consisting of factual data, performance
statistics, verbal descriptions and video depictions of the ballplayers were mere
bits of baseball history carved from baseball’s mosaic. 129
The court ultimately concluded that MLB was simply making historical
facts available to the public through game programs and that “mere recitations

122. Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 310.
123. Id at 310-311.
124. Id. at 310.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Gionfriddo, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 314 (emphasis added). The “balancing test” the Court is
referring to is the test that requires the right to be protected from unauthorized publicity be
balanced against the public interest in the dissemination of news and information which will be
discussed below with the public interest section.
129. Id. The precise information used by the MLB in the Gionfriddo case is as follows:
[The] names of players included on All-Star and World Series rosters; descriptions of
memorable performances from former games included within All-Star and World Series
game programs created for the benefit of the media and the enjoyment of the fans;
photographs and video clips taken of plaintiff’s when they were playing the game
themselves, and made available to the public through Web sites, home videos, and other
programs presenting historic events from long ago.
Id.
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of the players’ accomplishments” and factual data concerning athletic
performance commanded a substantial public interest. 130 The court reasoned
that the records and statistics remain of interest to the public because they
provide a context that allows fans to better appreciate the performances of
today’s players, and the history of professional baseball is integral to the full
understanding and enjoyment of the current game. 131
By looking at the underlying nature of the information, the court was able
to conclude that the information being used was raw, factual and historical data
which should not be included in one’s identity. By avoiding the earlier
decisions of Palmer and Ulhaender the court was able to focus on the nature of
the information and make an independent ruling on identity.
E. What Constitutes a Commercial Use?
As Professor Jack Williams correctly points out, “the right of publicity has
developed to protect the commercial interest of celebrities in their
identities.” 132 The theory underlying this concept is that a celebrity’s identity
can be valuable in the promotion of products and that the celebrity has an
interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation
of that identity. 133 However, courts and commentators have been less than
clear when determining what constitutes a commercial exploitation of one’s
identity.
When wrestling with this question, a majority of courts have made the
distinction between exploitation for commercial purposes or trade and
exploitation of one’s identity for the purposes of public interest. 134
Traditionally, courts allow a third party to exploit one’s identity for
commercial purposes if the information being exploited is a matter of the
public interest. 135 This distinction, usually brought up as a First Amendment
defense at common law, has even crept its way into some state statutes. 136 For
example, California’s statutory version of the right of publicity specifically
allows a third party to “use of name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness
in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or account, or
any political campaign . . . .” 137
Courts typically recognize a commercial setting as one that denotes the use
of a person’s identity in the advertising, promotion or connection with the

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Id at 314-315.
Id. at 315.
See Williams, supra note 68, at 1715.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1997) (emphasis added).
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actual goods or services themselves. 138 The unpermitted use of one’s identity
in the advertising of commercial goods and services are the most common acts
that trigger liability for an invasion of one’s right of publicity. 139 Examples
include the use of a sound-a-like Bette Midler singer in a Ford Truck television
advertisement or printing pictures of “Spanky” the Little Rascals star on hats,
shirts and other products to promote a bar. 140
It is not always clear when the use of a person’s name, picture or likeness
constitutes a commercial use. For example, in Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics
World Corporation, 141 Titan, a promoter of professional wrestlers and
wrestling events, sued the defendant for the commercialization of the
wrestlers’ personalities under the New York privacy statute when the
defendant used several oversized photographs of Titan’s wrestlers in
publications produced by the defendant. 142 The trial court granted summary
judgment for Comics World, and Titan appealed arguing that the wrestlers’
photographs were used for “purposes of trade” which violated the statute. 143
Although Titan conceded the public interest of professional wrestling, the court
stated that “it is appropriate for a court to consider whether the public interest
aspect of publication is merely incidental to its commercial purpose.” 144 The
court further noted that, “a photograph accompanying an article concerning a
matter of public interest may still be considered a use for the purpose of trade
if it has no real relationship to the article.” 145
The court ultimately found a genuine issue of material fact that the
defendant’s use amounted to “trade” and suggested a multi-factored test for
determining whether there has been a use for the purposes of trade, including
factors such as “the nature of the item, the extent of its relationship to the
traditional content of a magazine, the ease with which it may be detached from
the magazine, whether it is suitable for use as a separate product once detached
and how the publisher markets the item.” 146 The multi-factored test set forth in
Titan has proved difficult to apply, and thus gained little impetus as it only has
138. See MCCARTHY, supra note 66, at § 7:2.
139. Id. at § 7:6. This site provides a laundry list of violations of one’s commercial identity in
the use of products and advertising. Id.
140. See MIDLER V. FORD MOTOR CO., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988); MCFARLAND V.
MILLER, 14 F.3d 912, 913-914 (3d Cir. 1994).
141. 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989).
142. Titan Sports, 870 F.2d at 86.
143. Id. Note it was undisputed that Titan was the owner of all the rights in the names and
likeness of the wrestlers affiliated with Titan. Id. at 87.
144. Id. at 87-88 (quoting Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc., 457 N.Y.S.2d 308, 313
(N.Y. App. Div. 1982)). Note that some courts equate newsworthiness with public interest. Id.
The court here uses these terms interchangeably. Id.
145. Id. at 88 (quoting Stephano v. News Group Publ’ns Inc., 474 N.E.2d 580, 585 (N.Y.
1984)).
146. Id. at 89.
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been followed by courts in that jurisdiction. 147 However, the court in Titan
underlined an important principle for determining the application of the public
interest exception to the right of publicity - a court should consider whether the
public interest aspect of the information is merely incidental to its purpose.
F. The Public Interest Exception
Although the test in Titan has received little acceptance, most states that
recognize the right of publicity either through state statute or common law also
recognize a public interest exception as hinted to by the court in Titan. The
public interest exception allows a third party to use one’s identity in a
commercial setting if the information being exploited is of public interest and
outweighs the celebrity’s proprietary interest. Focusing on this exception, the
Gionfriddo case provides an excellent application of the public interest
exception to the commercial use of one’s identity.
After addressing the issue of identity, the court in Gionfriddo
independently focused on the plaintiffs’ contention that using the players’
names and statistical information within game programs and Web sites
constituted a commercial text, thereby entitling them to protection to under the
First Amendment. 148 Further, the plaintiffs argued that the baseball owners
were making a profit and the players’ achievements were being exploited to
promote the product of baseball with any historical value being a coincidence
or incidental. 149
Since the right of publicity is a statutory and common law right in
California, the court addressed the issue of commercialization for both rights.
The court framed the common law issue around the First Amendment, as
referenced above, and concluded that MLB’s uses of the plaintiffs’ statistical
information was not “commercial speech” within the meaning of the First
Amendment because “[t]he core notion of the commercial speech does no
more than propose a commercial transaction.” 150 The Court reasoned that
MLB’s “uses were included as minor historical references to plaintiffs within
game programs and Websites and in videos documenting baseball’s past, rather
than in an advertisement selling a product.” 151 The court also distinguished
MLB’s uses from contexts where “the primary message is to buy,” as in an
advertisement, and concluded that the public’s enduring fascination with

147. The only two cases to follow are Psihoyos v. Nat’l Examiner, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766, 17701771 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) and Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
148. Gionfriddo v. Major League Baseball,114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 316 (quoting Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 255 F.3d 1180, 1183-1184 (9th
Cir. 2001)).
151. Id.
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baseball and the free dissemination of information regarding baseball’s history
far outweighs any proprietary interest at stake. 152
When analyzing the statutory claim which allowed the use of a “name,
voice, signature, photograph or likeness in connection with any news, public
affairs, or sports broadcast or account...,” the court concluded that MLB’s uses
came within the “public affairs” exemption to the statutory right of
publicity. 153 The court relied on Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 154 where a
famous surfer sued the producer of a surfing video documentary, claiming the
use of his surfing footage and prior interviews in the documentary violated
both common law and statutory appropriation of his name and likeness. 155 On
the California statutory cause of action, the court in Dora broadly interpreted
the term “public affairs” “to include things that would not necessarily be
considered news” and also was “intended to mean something less important
than news.” 156 The court in Dora further reasoned that:
[w]e cannot limit the term public affairs to topics that might be concerned on
public television or public radio. To do so would be to jeopardize society’s
right to know because publishers and broadcasters could be sued for use of
name and likeness in documentaries on subjects that do not relate to politics or
public policy, and may not even be important but are of interest. 157

The court in Dora concluded that surfing has created a lifestyle that
influences an entire culture which commands more than a passing interest to
some and the use of the plaintiff’s footage and past interviews were not an
infringement of the plaintiff’s right of publicity. 158
In light of this case, the court in Gionfriddo concluded that MLB’s
Websites, documentaries and game day programs were entitled to the same
protection afforded to the surfing documentary in Dora. 159 The court stated
152. Id. at 316, 318. The court focused on the case of Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp. ,
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996), where the plaintiff sued the defendant for using his former name,
Lew Alicindor, in a commercial broadcast during the 1993 NCAA basketball tournament. Id. at
316. The commercial asked, “Who holds the record for being voted the most outstanding player
of this tournament?” Id. Then the plaintiff’s name and the three years he received the award
where then printed on the screen. Id. The court concluded that the defendant used the
information in the context of an automobile advertisement not in a news or sports account and,
therefore, defendant made a valid case for violation of his right of publicity. Id. However, the
court in Abdul-Jabbar fell victim to the same faulty analysis used by the Courts in Palmer and
Uhlaender. The court focused only on how the information was being used and not the nature of
the information. Under a Gionfriddo analysis, the Abdul-Jabbar case comes out differently.
153. Gionfriddo,114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 318.
154. 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 790 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
155. Dora, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 791.
156. Id. at 794.
157. Id.
158. Id. 794-795.
159. Gionfriddo,114 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 319.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERISTY SCHOOL OF LAW

2007]

THE LEGAL GAME BEHIN D FAN TASY SPORTS

151

that baseball, as America’s “national pastime,” has a pervasive influence on
our culture, and MLB’s uses are exempt from a statutory right of publicity
action due to the “public affairs” exemption. 160
Courts have drawn a line in applying the public interest exception, but the
line is far from settled. On one extreme there lies Padillo v. MRA Holding
LLC, 161 where the plaintiff was caught on tape removing her bikini top on a
boat and subsequently placed in the well-known, girl flashing video entitled
Girls Gone Wild. 162 In response to the plaintiff’s right of publicity claim, the
defendants argued that the actions of young people flashing their breasts have
generated a great deal of public interest. 163 The court concluded that the
videos did not represent issues of widespread public interest because the
defendants were not participating in a public dialogue about the condition of
American society in general, but rather are only intended to increase the sales
for the defendants’ benefit. 164
In contrast, the court in Creel v. Crown Publishers, Inc. 165 found the use of
plaintiff’s picture as published in a “World Guide to Nude Beaches and
Recreation” did not violate New York’s right of privacy statute. 166 T he court
held that a guide to beaches where nude sun bathing is permitted is a matter of
the public interest because the photograph was used to illustrate a guide book
and not used for the purposes of “trade.” 167
Similarly, the court in Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc. 168 allowed
a newspaper to produce and sell posters to the general public of a previously
published paper depicting the plaintiff in celebration of his Super Bowl
victories. 169 The plaintiff sued for commercial misappropriation of his name,
photograph and likeness. 170 The court concluded that the newspaper accounts
of winning two Super Bowls and four championships in a single decade
constituted publication of matters in the public interest which were protected
under California’s statutory right of publicity. 171
In summary, the right of publicity protects against the use of one’s identity
for commercial use or exploitation. A commercial use is usually defined as
one that denotes the use of person’s identity in the advertising, promotion or

160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id.
2004 WL 2988172 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004).
P ADILLA, 2004 WL 2988172 at *1.
Id.
Id. at *6.
496 N.Y.S.2d 219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
Creel, 496 N.Y.S.2d at 220.
Id.
40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
Montana, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 640.
Id.
Id. at 641.
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connection with the actual goods or services themselves. However, as the
Titan case illustrates, determining if a use is purely commercial can be difficult
if the use is not in the traditional form of an advertisement or connected with a
consumer product.
The public interest exception, usually in the form of a First Amendment
defense at common law or a statutory “public affairs” exception, allows a third
party to commercially use one’s identity if the information is of public interest.
Baseball statistics, surfing documentaries and travel guides to nude beaches
have been construed as satisfying the public interest exception to the right of
publicity.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
For MLB to successfully claim an infringement of copyright by C.B.C.
Marketing and Distribution Inc., the MLB must convince the Court that
statistics from the underlying sports event, which are released into the public
domain, are in fact copyrightable and that the originality of the MLB’s fantasy
databases meets the minimum level of creativity to afford copyright protection.
In light of National Basketball Association v. Motorola, the performances of
professional athletes are not copyrightable because sporting events do not
constitute original works of authorship and reciting mere facts about the game
does not constitute an infringement of the broadcast. Thus, the logic expressed
by the Court in Motorola is equally applicable to professional baseball
statistics because they are mere facts about the game and because the court in
Motorola extended its protection to “sports events” which clearly embraces
MLB.
Further, the compilation of professional performance statistics in a fantasy
baseball format lacks the minimum level of creativity to afford copyright
protection. In order to show originality in a factual compilation, a level of
creativity must be shown in the selection and arrangement of the facts.
However, fantasy baseball operates on the use of general or raw statistics.
Unlike Kregos, where the Court saw “scores” of possibilities, fantasy baseball
operates on categories of statistics that are no more complicated or unusual
than those statistics that are posted in a typical newspaper box score. To put it
another way, fantasy baseball providers use “garden-variety” baseball
statistics, such as home runs, runs batted in and steals to compile a typical and
expected statistical database. The creativity of simply compiling newspaper or
“garden-variety” baseball statistics is too minimal to fulfill this standard which
is already thin on protection.
Additionally, the arrangement of online fantasy baseball databases does
not reach the level of creativity needed to afford copyright protection. Fantasy
baseball subscribers can search and arrange the statistics in virtually any way
the user pleases, thus, negating the organizer’s arrangement of the original
factual compilation.
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Also, the policy considerations set forth in N.B.A. v. Motorola support an
open fantasy baseball market. The Court in Motorala reasoned that sports
events are not authored inany common sense of the word and what
“authorship” there is in a sports event must be open to copying by competitors
if fans are to be attracted to the sport. Thus, if ownership of a professional
baseball statistic lies with MLB, fans will be denied greater access to general
information about the nation’s most beloved game. As Fred Villaruil, a
computer consultant that spends much of his free time playing fantasy football
states, “[w]e’re all watching these weird games that no one else wants to
watch...Who else is going to watch the [Cleveland] Browns and [Baltimore]
Ravens unless Jamal Lewis is on your fantasy team?” 172 Further, Brian
Rolapp, the National Football League’s Vice President of Media Strategy,
found that people who play fantasy football end up watching two to three hours
more of NFL action on television.” 173 Fans and spectators are attracted to
professional sports to witness history breaking home runs or the possibility of a
no hitter and denying fans the access to the raw numbers which these
performances produce would detract fans from MLB.
When the court in C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major
League Baseball is presented with the question of whether a statistic is a part
of one’s identity, the court should first determine the nature of the information
being used instead of only focusing on the commercialization of the
information. In a fantasy sports game the nature of the information is raw,
statistical and historical data which is released into the public domain. The
information utilized by fantasy baseball providers is the same type of raw,
historical information as used in Gionfriddo where MLB relentlessly and
successfully argued that the data should remain accessible to the public
regardless of the context the information was being used. These “mere bits of
baseball history” which are carved from baseball’s mosaic provide the fan a
context to better appreciate the performances of today’s ballplayers and the
history of professional baseball is integral to the full understanding and
enjoyment of the current game.
Additionally, the court in Gionfriddo concluded that MLB did not violate
the ballplayers’ right of publicity by using their names in connection with the
statistics. This is because using the players’ names simply gives the statistic a
context so that it can be understood. What is being exploited is the statistic,
not the players’ names. Without accompanying the name to the statistic, the

172. See Johnson, supra note 5. This quote is not helpful unless it is put into context. In the
2005 football season, the Cleveland Browns and Baltimore Ravens had a identical records of six
wins and ten losses and finished last and second to last in their division respectively. Unless you
are a die hard Browns or Ravens fan or play fantasy football, you probably did not tune into many
of these teams’ games.
173. Id.
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statistic becomes meaningless. Therefore, the name associated with the
statistic is essentially apart of the historical fact which allows the fan to
appreciate the overall performance of the player.
Further, fantasy sports providers convey information in which the public
has a substantial interest. The court in Gionfriddo recognized that baseball has
a pervasive influence on our culture and that records and statistics remain of
interest to the public because they provide a context that allows fans to better
appreciate the game. 174 The court also recognized that the public has an
enduring fascination in the records set by ballplayers and memorable moments
from previous games. 175 As illustrated by Gionfriddo, the public interest in
baseball statistics far outweighs any proprietary interest a player or
organization has in retaining ownership of the statistic even against a
significant revenue builder, such as selling baseball programs. 176 Even though
the proprietary interest in fantasy baseball is high, courts have upheld the
public interest exception against purely commercial settings, such as the sale of
travel brochures and sports programs and even the production of a surfing film.
Since the public interest in “America’s national pastime” far outweighs the
interest in nude beaches or surfing, the protection for using baseball statistics
should be given the utmost protection against any proprietary interest one has
in retaining ownership of the numbers.
This article proposes that professional performance statistics, such as a
home run or stolen base, as used in the fantasy baseball world are not subject
to copyright protection or subject to claims under the right of publicity. As a
scholar, fan and one of the four million Americans that enjoy the cyber version

174. Giofriddo v. Major League Baseball, 114 Cal. Rptr. 2d 307, 315 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
175. Id. at 318.
176. For example, a 2006 World Series Program can be purchased for $15.00 at MLB’s
Website, http://shop.mlb.com/product/index.jsp?productId=2537518 (last visited Feb. 25, 2007).
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of baseball, this author urges courts and commentators to shape the law in this
direction. 177
BRANDON T. MOONIER *

177. On August 8, 2006, United States Magistrate Judge Mary Ann Medler of the United
States Eastern District of Missouri granted a summary judgment motion in favor of C.B.C.
Distribution and Marketing stating that C.B.C.’s use of the players’ records does not establish a
violation of the players’ right of publicity. C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 443 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1107 (E.D. Mo. 2006). Judge Medler
stated, “C.B.C.’s use of the baseball players’ names and playing records in the circumstances of
this case, moreover, does not involve the character, personality, reputation or physical appearance
of the players; it simply involves historical facts about the baseball players, such as their batting
averages, home runs, doubles, triples, etc. . . .” Id. at 1089. Further, Judge Medler wrote that:
[c]learly, the names and playing records of Major League Baseball players as used by
CBC in its fantasy baseball games are akin to the names, towns and telephone numbers in
a phone book, to census data, and to news of the day . . . The court finds, therefore,
that . . . the players’ names and playing records as used by C.B.C. in its fantasy games are
not copyrightable.
Id. at 1102-1103.
A proper case note would flesh out the reasoning behind the court’s conclusions, but it is
important to note that Judge Medler’s decision stands to further the purpose provided by this
paper.
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